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Security proof of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted a lot of attentions in
recent years. Most of real-life QKD implementations are based on phase-coding BB84 protocol,
which usually uses Unbalanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (UMZI) as the information coder and
decoder. However, the long arm and short arm of UMZI will introduce different loss in practical
experimental realizations, the state emitted by Alice’s side is nolonger standard BB84 states. In
this paper, we will give a security analysis in this situation. Counterintuitively, active compensation
for this different loss will only lower the secret key bit rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution [1] [2] is the art of allowing
two distant parties Alice and Bob to remotely establish
a secret key combining with an authenticated classical
channel and a quantum channel. The unconditional se-
curity of quantum key distribution bases on fundamental
laws of quantum mechanics. The unconditional security
of QKD protocol with perfect experimental setup (the
source is perfect single photon source and so on) has been
respectively given by Lo, Chau [3], Shor, Preskill [4], Ren-
ner [5] et al. Furthermore, Gottesman, Lo, Lukenhaus
and Preskill (GLLP) [6] have given an analysis of security
of QKD bases on practical source. In their security anal-
ysis, the final secret key bit can be generated if we can
estimate the lower bound of the secret key bits generated
by the single-photon pulse. More recently, Scarani [7] has
analyzed security of QKD with finite resources. Mean-
while, the experimental realization about QKD also has
a rapid progress in recent years [8][9][10][11][12][13][14].
In practical quantum key distribution realizations,
UMZI[15][16][17] method is commonly used. However,
the Phase Modulator (PM) in the interferometer is not
perfect, which means it will introduce much more loss
than the arm has no PM. As a result, in this case photon
states emitted by Alice’s side is not the standard BB84
state (we call it unbalanced states in the next section),
which means security of quantum key distribution based
on this states can not be satisfied with GLLP formula.
Of course, one can give a simple security proof when the
loss of the PM is considered as an operation controlled
by Eve and then GLLP can be used to calculate the final
secret key rate. However, the secret key rate in this case
is not optimal.
To give an optimal security proof of QKD with unbal-
anced BB84 states, we propose that the real-life source
can be replaced by a virtual source without lowering se-
curity of the protocol, then the final secret key rate can
be improved obviously.
II. QKD WITH UNBALANCED
MACH-ZEHNDER INTERFEROMETER
In this section, we will introduce the general QKD
setup with UMZI method, a schematic of this QKD setup
can be illustrated as in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: QKD setup with Unbalanced Mach-Zehnder Inter-
ferometer.
In Alice’s half-interferometer, there is a Phase Modu-
lator (PM) in the long arm. Correspondingly, the weak
coherent state entering the quantum channel can be di-
vided into coherent state from the short arm and from
the long arm respectively, both of them can be given as
the following,
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where, |α〉s is the weak coherent states in the short arm,
|β〉l is the weak coherent states in the long arm after the
PM, |n〉s is the n photon state in the short arm, |n〉l
is the n photon state in the long arm after the PM, µ
denotes the mean photon number of the short arm, ν
denotes the mean photon number of the long arm, eiϕ
is the phase modulated by the PM in the long arm. eiθ
is selected uniformly at random because of Eve has no
2prior knowledge of the phase. Combining with Lo and
Preskill’s method of phase randomization in Ref. [18],
the density matrix of the state emitted by Alice is
ρ =
∫ 2pi
0
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where, µ+ ν is the mean photon number in the quantum
channel emitted by Alice, a+ is the creation operator.
We have given the practical state as in equations (4,5),
thus the practical single photon state after the PM is
(the phase of the photon from the long arm is randomly
modulated by 0, 0.5pi, pi, 1.5pi)
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The long arm and short arm have the same loss in the
ideal case, which means PM in Alice’s side is perfect,
thus we can get µ = ν. However, the long arm will
introduce much more loss than the short arm in practical
side, which means µ > ν in practice, the state emitted
by Alice’s side becomes unbalanced correspondingly.
For simplicity, the practical PM can be replaced by
a perfect PM plus an unbalanced attenuator, the unbal-
anced attenuator only attenuate the photon from the long
arm, while the photon from the short arm can be past
without any attenuation. Since the single photon state
in this case is not the perfect BB84 state for the eaves-
dropper Eve, formula for the final secret key rate (GLLP)
can not be satisfied in this case. To solve this problem,
we will analyze the final secret key rate with practical
UMZI method. For improving the final secret key rate,
an unitary transformation will be proposed in the next
section.
III. SECURITY OF QKD WITH UNBALANCED
MACH-ZEHNDER INTERFEROMETER
In this section, we will first give a very simple secu-
rity analysis of QKD with practical Unbalanced Mach-
Zehnder Interferometer. As mentioned in section II, the
half-interferometer in Alice’s side can be seen as an un-
balanced attenuator in the quantum channel. A simple
security proof in this case can be illustrated as the fol-
lowing.
We can simply assume the unbalanced attenuator is
not controlled by Alice, which is part of the quantum
channel controlled by Eve, then the quantum state emit-
ted by Alice is standard BB84 states, and the final se-
cret key rate can be calculated. Based on this assump-
tion, combining with security analysis of the ideal decoy
method QKD protocol [19][20][21][22][23][24][25], the up-
per bound of secret key bit rate generated by standard
single-photon BB84 states can be given by
P110
−αl
10 PAPB = e
−2µ2µ10
−αl
10
ν
2µ
(7)
where, P1 = e
−2µ2µ is the probability distribution of the
single photon state, α is the loss efficiency in the quan-
tum channel, l is the fiber length, PA =
µ+ν
2µ is the pass
efficiency in Alice’s side, PB =
ν
µ+ν is the pass efficiency
in Bob’s side. Therefore, according to secret key rate
formula GLLP, the final secret key bit rate is just the
key rate with ideal PM but is lowered by the attenuation
constant ν/µ.
However, the final secret key rate is low in this case.
For improving the final secret key rate, an unitary trans-
formation will be proposed as in Fig. 2.
FIG. 2: UMZI method QKD with an assumption unitary
transformation and virtual source.
We will prove the practical state, as in equation (6), is
as security as standard BB84 states by considering the
practical state is equal to the standard BB84 state com-
bining with an unitary transformation.
The unitary transformation in our paper is an virtual
setup, which does not need to be implemented in practi-
cal QKD experimental realization, the detailed illustra-
tion of the unitary transformation is given as the follow-
ing,
U |1〉l|0〉A =
√
ν√
µ
|1〉l|0〉A +
√
µ−ν√
µ
|0〉l|1〉A
U |n〉l|0〉A = |n〉l|0〉A n 6= 1
U |m〉s|0〉A = |m〉s|0〉A m = 0, 1, · · ·
(8)
where, |0〉A, |1〉A are mutually orthogonal states in Al-
ice’s system, which are unknown to Alice. The pass ef-
ficiency of the single photon states is Psuc =
µ+ν
2µ . The
practical photon state in Alice’s side can be seen as the
standard BB84 state emitted by a virtual source com-
bining with the unitary transformation. Then security
of practical QKD setup is equal to security of QKD with
the virtual source. Combining with the method given in
Ref. [6], we can prove the unconditional security of new
source QKD in the following.
3As mentioned in section II, the probability that sin-
gle photon unbalanced states emitted by Alice’s side is
e−(µ+ν)(µ + ν). Combining with the unitary transfor-
mation, the probability distribution of the single photon
state of the virtual source emitted by Alice’s side is
p˜1 =
e−(µ+ν)(µ+ν)
Psuc
(9)
Similarly, the probability distribution of the vacuum
state and multi-photon state of the virtual source can be
given by
p˜0 = e
−(µ+ν) − e−(µ+ν)( (µ+ν)
Psuc
− (µ+ ν))
p˜n = e
−(µ+ν) (µ+ν)n
n! n > 2
(10)
Obviously, the real-life setup of Alice can be replaced
by the virtual source and the basis-independent unitary
transformation equivalently. According to GLLP, the
basis-independent unitary transformation cannot lower
the security of the QKD with the virtual source, then we
can calculate the upper bound of the secret key bit rate,
that is
p˜1psuc10
−αl
10 PB = e
µ+ν(µ+ ν)10
−αl
10
ν
µ+ν
(11)
Comparing with equation (7), upper bound of the se-
cret key bit rate can be improved eµ−ν times with our
security analysis. From equation (11), we can see the
real-life unbalanced single photon states can be generated
from standard single photon states safely. Therefore, se-
curity of the real-life unbalanced single photon states is
the same as standard single photon states, and GLLP
formula is satisfied in this situation. Combining with our
security analysis, one click of one real-life unbalanced sin-
gle photon states can bring one key bit safely.
One may argue that the problem can be taken away
by adding the same PM on the short arm, which can be
controlled by Alice. However, the same PM should be
added in Bob’s short arm for lowing the bit error rate in
this case, thus the secret key rate is
P110
−αl
10 P
′
AP
′
B = e
−2µ2µ10
−αl
10
ν
2µ
(12)
where P
′
A = 1 is the pass efficiency in Alice’s side,
P
′
B =
ν
2µ is the pass efficiency in Bob’s side. Obviously,
equation (12) is the same as equation (7), thus the secret
key rate is lower comparing with our situation. On the
other hand, all the unbalanced multi-photons emitted by
Alice’s side cannot carry any secret key bit, thus we can
conclude that our key bit rate is optimal.
IV. SIMULATION
Similar to the method in Ref. [23], we will give the sim-
ulation result of the lower bound of the final secret key
rate by considering equations (9) and (10) in this section.
The mean photon number of µ is 0.4 and the mean pho-
ton number of ν is 0.067 in the simulation. Combining
with GYS [26] parameters, the simulation result can be
shown in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3: Key generation rate for different transmission dis-
tance, the upper line is the ideal case, where the PM is perfect,
the middle line is the calculation result with our method, the
low line is the calculation result without our method.
From the simulation result, we can see that the longest
transmission distance can be improved obviously with
our security analysis.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed security of UMZI method QKD with
practical phase modulator by introducing a virtual source
and an unitary transformation in this paper. Corre-
spondingly, the optimal key bit rate has been given with
our security analysis. From the simulation result, we
can see that our method can improve the final secret key
rate obviously. Quite interestingly, if the different loss
was compensated actively, the final secret key rate will
be lower comparing with no compensation.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by National Fundamen-
tal Research Program of China (2006CB921900), Na-
tional Natural Science Foundation of China (60537020,
60621064) and the Innovation Funds of Chinese Academy
of Sciences. ∗To whom correspondence should be ad-
dressed, Email: zfhan@ustc.edu.cn.
4[1] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, in Proceedings IEEE Int.
Conf. on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing,
Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175-179.
[2] Valerio Scarani, Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci, Nicolas J.
Cerf, Miloslav Dusek, Norbert Lutkenhaus, Momtchil
Peev , Rev.Mod. Phys. 81, 1301 (2009).
[3] Hoi-Kwong Lo, H. F. Chau, Science 283, 5410 (1999).
[4] W. Shor, J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, p. 441, (2000).
[5] R. Renner, Security of Quantum Key Distribution, PhD
thesis, Diss. ETH No 16242, quant-ph/0512258.
[6] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, Norbert Lukenhaus, and John
Preskill , Quantum Inf. Comput4, 325 (2004)
[7] Valerio Scarani, Renato Renner, Phys.Rev.Lett 100,
200501 (2008)
[8] Y. Zhao, B. Qi, X. Ma, H.-K. Lo, and L. Qian Phys. Rev.
Lett. 96, 070502 (2006)
[9] C.-Z. Peng, J. Zhang, D. Yang, W.-B. Gao, H.-X. Ma, H.
Yin, H.-P. Zeng, T. Yang, X.-B. Wang, and J.-W. Pan
Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010505 (2007)
[10] D. Rosenberg, J. W. Harrington, P. R. Rice, P. A.
Hiskett, C. G. Peterson, R. J. Hughes, A. E. Lita, S.
W. Nam, and J. E. Nordholt Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010503
(2007)
[11] Tobias Schmitt-Manderbach et al. Phys.Rev.Lett 98,
010504 (2007)
[12] Yi Zhao, Bing Qi, X.-F. Ma, H.-K. Lo, Li Qian Proceed-
ings of IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory 2006, pp. 2094-2098 (2006).
[13] L. Yuan, A. W. Sharpe, and A. J. Shields Appl. Phys.
Lett. 90, 011118 (2007)
[14] Zhen-Qiang Yin, Zheng-Fu Han, Wei Chen, Fang-Xing
Xu, Guang-Can Guo, Chin. Phys. Lett 25, 3547 (2008)
[15] C. H. Bennett,, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121, (1992).
[16] Xiao-Fan Mo, Bing Zhu, Zheng-Fu Han, You-Zhen Gui,
and Guang-Can Guo, Opt. Lett. 30, 2632 (2005).
[17] Z. F. Han, X. F. Mo, Y. Z. Gui, and G. C. Guo, Appl.
Phys. Lett. 86, 221103 (2005).
[18] H.-K. Lo and J. Preskill, quant-ph/0504209.
[19] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[20] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94,
230504 (2005).
[21] X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[22] Xiang-Bin Wang, C.-Z. Peng, J. Zhang, L. Yang, Jian-
Wei Pan , Phys. Rev. A 77, 042311 (2008).
[23] X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao, H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 72, 012326
(2005).
[24] Zhen-Qiang Yin, Yi-Bo Zhao, Zheng-Wei Zhou, Zheng-
Fu Han, Guang-Can Guo, Phys. Rev. A 77, 062326
(2008).
[25] Zhen-Qiang Yin, Zheng-Fu Han, Fang-Wen Sun, Guang-
Can Guo, Phys. Rev. A 76, 014304 (2007).
[26] C. Gobby, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys.
Lett.84, 3762 (2004).
